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Abstract 
What explains the cross-national variation in inflation rates across countries? In contrast to 
most literature, which emphasizes the role of ideas and institutions, this paper focuses on 
electoral politics and argues that ageing leads to lower inflation rates. Countries with a larger 
share of elderly exhibit lower inflation because older people are both more inflation averse and 
politically powerful, forcing parties seeking their votes to pursue lower inflation. Logistic 
regression analyses of survey data confirm that (1) older people are more inflation averse and 
(2) more likely to punish incumbents for inflation. Panel data regression analysis shows that (3) 
social democratic parties have more economically orthodoxy manifestos in European countries 
with more elderly people and that (4) the share of elderly is negatively correlated with inflation 
in both a sample of 21 OECD economies and a larger sample of 175 countries. Ageing therefore 
pushes governments to pursue lower inflation.  
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1. Introduction 
What explains the cross-national variation in inflation rates across developed countries? This 
question has been the subject of a large body of literature in both economics and comparative 
political economy. However, most studies to date have focused on the role of ideas, institutions, 
and economic factors (Cukierman, Web, & Neyapti, 1992; Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini, 
Malinvaud, & Pagano, 1991; Iversen, 1999; McNamara, 1998), and to a lesser extent interest 
groups (Posen, 1993, 1998), while paying insufficient attention to the role of electoral politics. 
The conventional wisdom captures part of the story for understanding variation in inflation rates, 
but the relative absence of electoral politics is surprising in two respects. First, this absence is at 
odds with the prominent role attributed to electoral politics in other political economy literature, 
for instance on labor market policies (Boix, 1998; Rueda, 2006; Vlandas, 2013a, 2013b) and the 
welfare state (Pierson, 1994, 1998). Second, inflation has identifiable distributive effects on 
different parts of the population which should therefore care about the level of inflation (Briault, 
1995; Hibbs, 1979: pp. 712-715; Laidler, 1997; Scheve, 2004). Electoral politics may therefore 
make it possible to understand why certain ideas and institutions are chosen in the first place. 
In this article, I seek to bring electoral politics back into the analysis of inflation by 
focusing on the preferences, power, and influence of a powerful social group: the elderly. This 
choice is motivated by both methodological and theoretical considerations. Methodologically, 
any analysis of the electoral determinants of inflation faces a problem of endogeneity. Many 
factors that affect the electorate’s preferences for inflation such as wages, employment status, or 
assets may be partly endogenous to macroeconomic policy and inflation rates. Theoretically, the 
chosen social group needs to have clearly identifiable inflation preferences.  
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As a first test of the role of electoral politics that minimizes both pitfalls, I choose to 
focus on the elderly—people aged 65 years and above. The elderly are clearly more inflation 
averse, and the share of elderly in a country is unlikely to be directly determined by inflation. 
Thus, the share of elderly is a good first case to investigate the impact of electoral preferences on 
inflation rates: It is highly correlated with factors that can be expected to influence inflation 
preferences but is not itself determined by inflation rates. The size of the elderly group across 
developed countries has also varied greatly over time, and the relevance of aging for welfare 
state policies has been well documented. 
I argue that ageing has important consequences for economic outcomes as governments 
must increasingly take into account the economic policy preferences of the elderly. My 
theoretical framework builds on clear micro-foundations, conceptualizes several causal 
mechanisms, and then tests a number of observable implications. I posit that the elderly are more 
inflation averse because they are more indifferent to unemployment than the rest of the 
population, being outside of the labor market, but are concerned about the real value of their 
savings and pensions. As the size of this politically powerful group of voters increases, I expect 
that political parties increasingly compete to attract their votes before elections by adopting 
economically orthodox party manifestos, and that when in power, parties then pursue policies 
that contain inflation to minimize the risk of an electoral penalty at the next election. As a result, 
in countries with a larger share of elderly, parties are more economically orthodox, governments 
delegate monetary policy to independent central banks to a greater extent, and inflation is lower. 
I test my argument in several steps. First, using logistic regression analysis of two 
separate surveys, I confirm that the elderly are more inflation averse. Second, using regression 
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analysis of party manifesto data, I find that political parties in countries with a larger share of 
elderly have more economically orthodox party manifestos that emphasize price stability. The 
results are consistent with a “party competition” model where social democratic parties become 
more orthodox but not with a “party constituent” model where conservative parties respond to 
the growing weight of elderly among their constituents. Third, logistic regression analysis of 
survey data on past votes suggests that the elderly penalize the incumbent for higher inflation 
more than the rest of the population. Fourth, I show that the share of elderly is positively 
correlated with central bank independence (CBI) in a sample of 21 countries that are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the period since 1960. 
Next, I demonstrate that the share of elderly is negatively correlated with inflation rates 
in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960. My panel data regression analysis controls for 
competing explanations and the results hold using a wide variety of specifications and estimation 
methods. These findings are not biased by non-stationarity as they remain when I run pure cross-
section, first difference, and error correction models (ECMs). When extending my analysis to a 
much larger sample of 175 countries for which data for the main variables are available, I find 
that the effect of the share of elderly on inflation only holds in democracies, thereby ruling out a 
purely economic effect linked to the elderly’s economic behavior. This effect holds when 
excluding countries with high GDP per capita from the analysis, suggesting that my results are 
not an artifact of economic modernization where aging and low inflation occur jointly as a by-
product of economic development. 
My findings have several wider implications. They show that aging has an important 
political impact on economic outcomes, and that electoral politics is a crucial factor in explaining 
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the cross-national variation in inflation rates. Bringing electoral politics back in therefore helps 
us make sense of the continuing variation in inflation rates across countries with similar 
institutions and economies. This article further suggests that as countries age, achieving low 
inflation becomes an increasingly strong political imperative, regardless of what may be 
economically desirable.  
The rest of the article enfolds as follows. The next section reviews previous literature and 
discusses my theoretical expectations. The second section then tests some of the causal 
mechanisms, while the third section tests the expectations of my model concerning the 
relationship between the share of elderly and inflation rates. The last section concludes with 
some implications for further research. 
 
2. The Political economy determinants of inflation rates 
2.1. Ideas, institutions and interest groups 
Three main approaches in comparative political economy have sought to explain variation in 
inflation rates across developed economies over time. The first approach has focused on the role 
of ideas2. In this approach, a new dominant economic narrative, new classical economics - and 
within it monetarism (Alt & Chrystal, 1983; Friedman, 1968) - emerged as a response to the 
perceived inability of governments to address the stagflation of the 1970s and convinced policy 
makers that any monetary induced employment gains over the long run fade away while 
resulting in higher inflation. This in turn made low inflation policies more appealing to 
government officials (e.g. Mc Namara 1998) and resulted in a shift away from the Keynesian 
                                                             
2 This short summary does not do justice to the sophistication of the argument – for a more comprehensive review, 
see Iversen & Soskice, 2006. 
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consensus that had prevailed in the post-war era until then (Hall, 1986). 
The second approach focused on the role of institutions and how these may help solve the 
time inconsistency problem, namely how to achieve lower inflation when policy makers may be 
tempted, for electoral gains, to pursue short term goals that may raise inflation (Alesina, Rubini 
& Cohen, 1999; Nordhaus, 1975; McRae, 1977). One solution to the time inconsistency problem 
that gained prominence was to partly or fully delegate monetary policy to independent central 
banks thereby convincing all actors that the commitment to low inflation was credible (Barro & 
Gordon, 1983; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Alesina, Mirrlees, & Neumann, 1989). As a result, agents 
would expect low inflation and this in turn becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, even in the 
absence of a monetary policy tightening (Grilli, Masciandaro, Tebellini, Malivaud & Pagano, 
1991). Independent central banks are expected to lead to lower inflation (Cuckierman, Webb & 
Neyapti, 1992; Eijffinger & de Haan, 1996; Debelle & Fischer, 1994) because central banks are 
more conservatives - in the sense that they prefer lower inflation than elected governments – and 
less receptive to electoral pressures.  
Both approaches are valuable in showing how various institutions and ideas affect 
inflation rates given certain interests in society. The problem with the ideational approach is 
what it leaves unanswered, namely whose ideas dominate policy making and why?3 In addition, 
most of this literature has been concerned with explaining the shift to a low inflation regime over 
time, making it difficult to use ideas to explain the cross-national variation in inflation rates we 
observe. To the extent that this literature focuses on the origins of these institutions, they are 
                                                             
3 McNamara (1998) does discuss what made the new paradigm attractive: a combination of policy failure (in dealing 
with oil shock), policy innovation (monetarism) and policy emulation (seeing Germany as an example of good policy). 
Here I do not wish to suggest that these are irrelevant, rather that this must be completed by an analysis of electoral 
politics. 
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either to be found in ideas or in the preferences of interest groups.  
In addition to ideas and institutions, several interest groups with an influence on inflation 
have been identified. This third approach to explaining inflation has stressed the importance of 
wage bargaining, trade unions and the export sector (Franzese, 2003; Hall & Franzese, 1998; 
Iversen, 1999). In the Keynesian era, unions moderated their wages in exchange for long term 
gains (Eichengreen 1996; Iversen and Soskice 2006). In countries with neo-corporatist 
institutions unions had greater incentives to exercise wage restraint because governments were 
offering them various welfare benefits in return (Cameron, 1984; Lange & Garrett, 1985), 
thereby minimizing both inflation and unemployment if wage moderation was coupled with the 
right fiscal and monetary policies (Cf. Scharpf 1987). Union members lack sufficient power to 
influence inflationary outcomes in countries with highly decentralized wage bargaining at the 
firm level, while large encompassing trade unions internalize the inflationary effects of their 
wage claims (Calmfors & Driffill 1988). Both arrangements should therefore result in lower 
inflation than where unions are strong but not encompassing. Finally, unions and employers in 
the export sector are inflation averse because they have a strong interest in retaining 
competitiveness, so countries with larger export sectors may exhibit lower inflation. 
Moreover, Posen (1995) showed that, because of its preference for low inflation, the 
financial sector has a pivotal role in supporting price stability in the long run. Rather than being a 
cause of low inflation, he reasoned, central bank independence was itself determined by the 
financial sector’s opposition to inflation. If this is true, both low inflation and central bank 
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independence are more likely in countries with stronger financial actors4, whether because of 
lobbying on the parts of financial actors (Posen, 1995) or through the discipline of capital 
markets (Maxfield, 1997). 
2.2. Ageing and electoral politics 
While valuable, previous literature tends to neglect electoral politics, which had been the focus 
of older studies in comparative political economy. Indeed, four decades ago, Hibbs (1977, 1986) 
showed that electoral politics cannot be ignored because left-wing and right-wing parties have 
different inflation-employment preferences as their respective constituencies are differently 
affected by inflation and unemployment. When choosing institutions governments therefore 
cannot be assumed to entirely disregard electoral constraints, and even when institutions are 
already given, governments could still in principle influence inflation rates through other policies 
(e.g. fiscal policy, welfare state benefits, and wage policies). 
However, focusing on left-right differences potentially overlooks changes in the 
electorate that may affect both left and right, in which case the effect would not necessarily 
operate via left-right differences in government partisanship. Over the long run, changes in the 
electorate’s preferences may be more important than differences between different parts of the 
electorate at one point in time. Rather than focusing on partisan differences, the focus of this 
paper is on how different groups in the population may have distinct inflation preferences and 
how the size of these groups may in turn feed into differences in inflation rates across countries. 
Inflation has distributional consequences (Briault 1995; Fischer 1994; Laidler 1997), so different 
                                                             
4 Cuckierman, Webb & Neyapti (1992) similarly suggested that the likelihood of making central bank independents 
was a function of the size of financial markets and subsequent literature has by and large confirmed Posen’s 
contention that central bank independence and low inflation requires political support to be sustained in the long run 
– see Berger, Eijffinger & De Haan (2001), Hayo (1998), Kuttner & Posen (2009), Miller (1998). 
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groups should have different inflation preferences. One difficulty in estimating the effect of the 
electorate’s preferences on inflation is that inflation may itself affect the characteristics of the 
electorate that shape their preferences. It is therefore crucial to use a criterion for identifying 
inflation averse groups that is as much as possible exogenous to inflation.  
One such criterion is age. Here I focus in particular on the elderly, defined as those aged 
65 years and over.5 Elderly people that are in retirement should care less (or not at all) about 
their employment prospect, since they derive their income from pensions and/or assets6 rather 
than employment, and are often net creditors, having repaid debts accumulated through 
mortgages7. By contrast, the young and/or those in the labor force tend to care more about 
employment than inflation given that most of their income depends on working and that they are 
often net debtors (Bach and Stephenson 1974). The point here is not that inflation is entirely 
irrelevant for workers nor that employment is entirely irrelevant for those above 65, but rather 
that the elderly should care comparatively more about inflation than the non-elderly. I therefore 
expect older individuals to be more inflation averse. 
Why does it matter what preferences elderly individuals hold? One answer is that 
developed economies have experienced a significant ageing of their population (Tepe & 
                                                             
5 Goerres 2009, pp 1-10, discusses the pros and cons of different cut-off points. For the purpose of minimizing the 
risk of capturing people who are not yet retired in our measure of inflation averse old people, it is safe to put the cut-
off point at 65. 
6 Elderly’s preferences are relative: what matters is their inflation preferences relative to the rest of the population, 
and similarly for their position in terms of income sources, asset wealth, etc. The OECD shows that over-65s rely to 
a large extent on non-work sources of income such as public transfers or capital income in the 2000s (OECD 2013: 
page 78). The retired increasingly do not rely on inflation adjusted defined benefits pensions. Pension’s benefits 
have become less generous in several countries and some defined pension schemes are not (or not sufficiently) 
inflation adjusted and hence inflation may still have adverse effects (OECD, 2013: 25). The elderly also have higher 
home ownership rate and derive a larger part of their income from capital, including non-inflation adjusted defined 
contribution schemes (ibid: 77-79). Estimates of the loss imposed by inflation over 20 years for non-inflation 
adjusted benefits are as large as one third (see Antolin, 2009). 
7 In most OECD countries more than 70% of the over-65s own their houses – see OECD (2013: 77). 
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Vanhuysse, 2009; Lynch & Myrskylä, 2009; Sinn & Uebelmesser, 2002). Almost 20% of the 
population in the Euro area is above 65, and 5% above 80. The old age dependency ratio (share 
of 65+ over those between 15 and 64) increased from 12.5% in 1950 to 23.8% in 2010 
(European Commission, 2014, pp. 23). By 2050, the share of elderly may reach almost 30% in 
the European Union, with more than 10% above 80 years old (European Commission, 2014, pp. 
410). In sum, the elderly are a large and growing group in the population. 
The elderly are a large group but this does not tell us how their preferences affect 
policies. There is a large literature in political economy that shows that individual preferences 
matter for policy outcomes (Rehm, 2016; Ansell, 2014; Rueda, 2006; Iversen & Soskice 2001). 
In line with public choice theory, we might expect that as the share of elderly moves closer to 
50% of the electorate, politicians will propose policies that reflect their preferences (Wilson, 
1991). While they never represent 50% of national electorates, the elderly are not only a large 
and growing group, they are also a group with considerable political power (Rose, 1965, pp. 13-
14; Goerres, 2009; Sinn and Uebelmesser, 2002). Starting in the 1960s in the US the elderly 
“began to think of themselves as members of an aging group” and analysts at the time contended 
that the “elderly seem to be on their way to becoming a voting bloc” (Rose, 1965, pp. 13-14). In 
more recent times, older people in Europe are more likely to vote (Goerres 2007) and are much 
more likely to be members of political parties (Goerres 2009). People in the 60-69 age group are 
also more likely to be union members than every over age group except 50 to 59 years old 
(Goerres 2009, table 5.1). Even in a country where the share of the elderly is comparatively 
lower such as the US, they may yield considerable political power: they are more likely to vote 
than any other age group and also more likely to vote in all elections, they are more informed 
about politics and a more important source of campaign contributions (MacManus 2000, pp. 2, 3, 
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7). In the 2012 US presidential election, the elderly accounted for as much as 22% of those who 
voted (File, 2014).  
Given their growing size and power, this has raised the question of whether they have 
excessive control on the policy process. In the German case, some authors warn of the advent of 
gerontocracy (Sinn & Uebelmesser, 2002, pp. 157) while in the US pensioner interest groups are 
seen to have significant lobbying power (Pampel & Williamson, 1985; Pierson, 1994). The 
impact of ageing on policies has been most systematically studied in welfare state studies, which 
suggest that ‘elderly power’ matters for both welfare state expansion and retrenchment 
(Busemeyer, Goerres, & Weschle., 2008; Esping-Andersen & Sarasa, 2002; Lynch 2006; 
Sabbagh & Vanhuysse, 2006). Previous research has in particular shown that spending on 
pensions is associated with a larger share of elderly (Persson & Tabellini, 2000; IMF 2004; 
Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin, 1999, 2003; Sinn & Uebelmesser, 2002; Galasso, 2006; Galasso & 
Profeta, 2007) because older and retired respondents are - not surprisingly - more supportive of 
pensions (Pamp, 2015, pp. 163). Conversely, they are less supportive of education (Sorensen, 
2013) and hence US states with more elderly tend to spend less on education (Poterba, 1998; 
Fletcher & Kenny, 2008; Harris, Evans & Schwab, 2001).  
While the association between the share of elderly and policies is therefore well-
established, the mechanisms through which this association operates tend to be under-explored in 
quantitative research. Thus for instance, consistent with most literature, a recent study notes that 
“the particular ways in which social policy responsiveness [of governments to the elderly] is 
conditioned by factors such as … electoral models, party politics, collective action problems, and 
institutional constraints…remain black boxes in our account” (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2010, pp. 
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218-219). Where it is discussed, one links the growing size of the elderly to the ageing of the 
median voter, which can then using a median voter theorem be expected to lead to changes in 
policy. In these approaches, “the higher weight of older voters…shifts the median voter 
equilibrium” (Persson & Tabellini, 2000, pp. 130).  
2.3. Ageing and inflation: a theoretical framework 
While the previous section suggests that we can expect the elderly to affect policy, what is 
missing for my purpose is an identification of the different possible mechanisms through which 
the growing share of elderly could influence inflation and of testable observable implications. I 
start from the premise that a defining feature of democracies is “congruence between citizen 
preferences and policy output” (Rehm, 2016, pp. 29). This assumption is reasonable in 
suggesting that governments respond to preferences but it does not specify why they respond and 
what they respond to. In what follows, I distinguish between two channels through which 
individual preferences in democracies can influence government policy.  
In a first indirect electoral channel, individuals choose politicians that represent – and 
once elected, implement - their policy preferences. This is where it is necessary to consider party 
dynamics to identify the precise mechanisms linking individual preferences and parties in power. 
Within this indirect electoral channel, I distinguish between a ‘party constituent’ model and a 
‘party competition’ model.  
In the ‘party constituent’ model, political parties have long lasting commitments to 
certain parts of the electorate and/or to certain ideologies. A higher share of the elderly may 
mean that they have an increased influence on the political party that disproportionally represents 
them and/or that, for example, conservative parties having a pre-existing ideological 
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commitment to low inflation find it easier to enact it when support among their constituents 
becomes sufficiently high as a result of the growing elderly electorate8. The elderly’s party 
identification is higher than other groups (Butler & Stokes, 1983; Goerres, 2009) and the 
evidence suggests that at least historically the elderly have been represented by conservative 
parties in several Western European countries. Thus for instance, the conservative party in the 
UK has historically been heavily supported by the elderly (Whiteley, Syed & Richardson, 1994). 
If the conservative party becomes more inflation averse to reflect the growing size of inflation 
averse elderly people, we would expect a positive correlation between the inflation aversion of 
conservative parties and the share of elderly across countries. However, the evidence is mixed 
and in some countries the elderly might not predominantly support the conservative parties. For 
instance, in a more recent analysis, Goerres (2008) finds no evidence that older voters in Britain 
and Germany are more likely to vote for conservative parties. Conservative parties may also find 
it difficult to respond entirely to elderly constituents if this clashes with the demands of 
important younger and middle-aged groups (cf. Kitschelt, 2004, pp. 9-10). 
In a ‘party competition’ model, political parties all compete for votes. One version of this 
model is that parties compete for the median voter. Previous literature has for instance used 
median voter models when assessing how ageing affects preferences for pension spending: as the 
median voter ages, she favors greater spending on pensions (Browning, 1975; Cooley & Soares, 
1999; Conesa & Krueger, 1999; Persson & Tabellini, 2000; Galasso, 2006; Galasso & Profeta, 
2007). Thus in my case, an ageing median voter becomes more inflation averse because the 
relative weight of her utility in old age, when she will no longer work and instead rely on fixed 
                                                             
8 Here I implicitly draw on the distinction between opportunistic and compositional mechanisms discussed in Ansell 
(2014, pp. 12). 
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income from assets and pensions, overtakes the weight of her utility in the present which 
depends on both employment opportunities and – in some cases – inflation protected wages. As 
the median voter becomes more inflation averse both parties have to become more inflation 
averse to acquire his/her electoral support. We would therefore expect a negative correlation 
between the age of the median voter, as proxied by the share of elderly, and the inflation 
aversion of all political parties on average and in particular of political parties that are forced to 
change their ideological position to meet their office seeking aspirations, most likely social 
democratic parties. 
This latter model explicitly or implicitly underpins most literature on ageing and pension 
politics discussed earlier, and while median age for most countries across time is not available, 
most studies use the share of the elderly as a reasonable proxy for median age. It is also possible 
- and even more plausible in proportional representation systems – that political parties target a 
combination of large groups of constituents rather than just the median voter, in which case the 
share of the elderly is the more appropriate measure. Consistent with this, there is some evidence 
of party competition over the elderly vote. For instance, the Australian Labour party actively 
targeted the elderly vote in marginal seats, which in turn forced John Howard to change his 
policies on health care and pensions to win the 2004 federal election (Uren, 2007). Equally, New 
Labour’s success in the UK was in large part due to its ability to attract elderly voters in the 1997 
election (Tilley, 2002). 
In the second - direct – channel, politicians “stay closely attuned to the ebb and flow of 
public opinion and adjust policy accordingly” when in power (Wlezien & Soroka, 2007, pp. 
805). There is a large and diverse literature on policy responsiveness which does convincingly 
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show that changes in public opinion do lead to changes in public policy (Canes-Wrone 2015). 
There are two reasons for this: first, elected politicians want to minimize “civil disobedience and 
protests”; second, they want to minimize the risk of “electoral losses for themselves” (Brooks & 
Manza, 2006, pp. 479). There is evidence for both an ex post and an ex ante process: elected 
governments who stray too far away from average opinion are punished if there is a challenger 
closer to public opinion (Hollibaugh, Rothenberg & Rulison, 2013) and they internalize public 
opinion to pre-empt electoral losses (Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson 2002; Page & Shapiro 1983).  
A similar intuition characterizes the economic voting literature but it considers 
macroeconomic outcomes rather than economic policies9. Individuals are seen to reward or 
punish governments in elections depending on economic performance, most notably 
unemployment and inflation. The research first analyzed popularity functions in the US and then 
later considered other advanced economies, as well as shifting the focus to actual aggregate 
votes10. It soon also started investigating the impact of retrospective and prospective subjective 
evaluations of the economy (Norpoth, 1996 ; Erikson, MacKuen & Stimson, 2000) as well as 
focusing more specifically on individual voting behavior. Overall, Lewis-Beck concludes that 
“changing economic conditions exert a force on Western European voters that approaches and 
sometimes exceeds the force of more traditional factors” (Lewis-Beck, 1988, pp. 85). Building 
on this literature, I argue that elderly voters penalize the incumbent for inflation to a greater 
extent than other social groups because they are more inflation averse. As a result, in countries 
with a larger share of elderly, incumbent parties should face a stronger electoral penalty for high 
                                                             
9 For general overviews see Lewis-Beck et al. (2007), Norpoth (1996), Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier (2000). 
10 See Paldam (1991) for an early treatment of the determinants of vote change in 17 developed democracies. 
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inflation than elsewhere and should therefore be more likely to pursue low inflation. 
In sum, a growing share of inflation averse elderly people can theoretically be expected 
to influence government policy and inflation because (1) parties that traditionally represent them 
become more inflation averse to reflect their growing importance, (2) parties target an ageing 
and hence increasingly inflation averse median voter, (3) parties increasingly compete for elderly 
votes, (4) governments target an average public opinion that is becoming more inflation averse 
as a result of ageing, or (5) the elderly impose a larger electoral penalty on the incumbent for 
‘excessive’ inflation and/or policies that increase inflation.  
If they wish to reduce inflation, governments have several tools at their disposal. First, 
they can choose certain institutions that contain inflation, for instance by delegating monetary 
policy to politically independent central banks. Second, governments can pursue certain policies 
that contain inflation. Thus for instance, even when central banks are partly independent, 
governments can sometimes continue to pursue conservative anti-inflation monetary policies 
(Posen, 1995, pp. 254) and they can affect the supply of money by altering credit rules and 
capital requirements for banks11. In addition to monetary policy tools, governments can influence 
inflationary outcomes via fiscal policy, which in turn shapes aggregate demand, and they can 
intervene in the wage bargaining process12, set statutory minimum wages or affect the 
reservation wage through labor market benefits. Thus, governments have several tools at their 
disposal to influence inflationary outcomes. We can therefore expect countries with a larger 
share of elderly to have more inflation-averse political parties, governments that choose 
                                                             
11 This mechanism applied to a greater extent in the 1960s and 1970s – see for instance Zysman (1977) on France. 
12 For instance in France, the government extends wage agreements to most workers in a sector regardless of 
whether they are unionised. 
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institutions which promote low inflation and that pursue policies which lower inflation more than 
other countries, and in turn these countries should exhibit lower inflation. 
Finally, if the old have different levels of assets and distinct consumption and investment 
behaviors (Yoon, Kim & Lee, 2014; Fair & Dominguez, 1991, Lindh & Malmberg, 2000, 
Bullard, Garriga & Walker, 2012), then there may be an economic association between ageing 
and inflation. In this case, we should observe a correlation between ageing and low inflation in 
both democracies and non-democracies, since intermediation through the political system is not 
necessary. If the effect operates in the political arena only, the correlation should only hold in 
democracies and we should find evidence for the political mechanisms identified above. 
 
3. Microfoundations and causal mechanisms 
3.1. Inflation aversion among the elderly 
To test my assumption concerning the elderly’s inflation preferences, I rely on two surveys. The 
first is the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on the Role of Government which 
includes four waves (1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006). I use two separate questions to derive my 
dependent variables. The first question is about whether controlling prices is government’s 
responsibility where respondents can choose: 4-definitely should be, 3-probably should be, 2-
probably should not be, and 1-definitely should not be. The second question asks respondents to 
choose whether the government should “keep inflation down” or “keep unemployment down”. 
My key independent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is elderly 
and 0 otherwise. I control for gender, years of schooling, country as well as time effects.  
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The results from a logistic regression analysis are presented in table 1. Elderly 
respondents are more inflation averse: in column 1 I use a binary dependent variable equal to 1 if 
respondents choose that controlling prices “should definitely be” government’s responsibility, 
and 0 otherwise; in column 2 the binary dependent variable equals 1 if respondents choose that 
controlling prices “definitely should be” or “probably should be” the government’s 
responsibility; in column 3 I rely on the full ordinal variable using ordinal logistic regression 
analysis; and column 4 reports the results when my dependent variable ’Inflation down’ takes 
value 1 if respondents choose “keep inflation down” and 0 if they choose “keep unemployment 
down”. Using age or being retired instead of being elderly does not change the results13 and my 
results are consistent with previous literature (Shiller, 1997, pp. 26, 27; Lelyveld, 1999, pp. 469, 
476; Scheve, 2004, pp. 11). 
Note that these results do not imply that the old have perfectly homogenous preferences, 
but merely that they are more likely to be inflation averse, ceteris paribus, than other age 
groups14. I use being elderly and/or retired as an instrument that captures other variables that 
affect inflation aversion rather than as a factor that necessarily and intrinsically affects inflation 
aversion, so these results could a priori be consistent with both a life cycle and a generational 
effect, but it is possible to explore which effect is at work. The ISSP waves are too close in time 
to really delineate generational versus lifecycle effect so I use instead the Mannheim 
Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt, Scholz, Leim & Moschner, 2008) covering the period 1970 
to 2002 in 15 western European countries. My dependent variable is derived from a question 
                                                             
13 See Table A4 and Table A5 in appendix. 
14 Similarly, there is a large literature (e.g. Boix 1998, Rueda 2006) that posits an impact of for instance labour 
market position on political preferences without necessarily implying that all individuals within a sub-category have 
totally homogenous preferences. 
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about which issue respondents find most important, where they can choose their first and second 
priority from four possibilities: “maintenance of law and order”, “giving people more say in 
government decision”, “fighting rising prices”, or “protecting freedom of expression”.  
Results shown in column 5 confirm that being elderly or retired is associated with a 
higher likelihood of identifying inflation as a first or second priority, when controlling for gender 
and education. Controlling for income or left-right placement and using a dependent variable that 
is coded 1 only if inflation is first priority does not change the results15. Rerunning the analysis 
on restricted samples covering only the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively, shows that being 
retired and/or elderly is positively associated with higher inflation aversion in each decade16. 
This support for the life cycle hypothesis is consistent with previous findings on elderly 
preferences towards pension and education policies (De Mello, Schotte, Tiongson & Winkler, 
2016, pp. 6). 
Table 1: The determinants of individual level inflation aversion 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Control  
prices 1 
Control  
prices 2 
Control  
prices 3 
Keep 
inflation 
down 
Inflation 
1st or 2nd 
priority 
Regression method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Elderly 0.137*** 0.193*** 0.137*** 0.077t 0.235*** 
Constant 0.566*** 3.066*** Several cuts -0.016 1.659*** 
Observations 74,134 74,134 74,134 17,088 468,452 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.10 
 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1. All columns control for education and gender. Column 
3 uses ordinal logistic analysis on an ordinal dependent variable (constant cuts not shown – see 
appendix) while all other columns use normal logistic analysis on binary dependent variables. Columns 1 
to 4 use the ISSP data. Using being ‘retired’ instead of being elderly does not change the results. Column 
5 uses Eurobarometer data and is robust to the use of a dependent variable that is coded 1 if respondents 
                                                             
15 See Tables A19 and A20 in appendix. 
16 See Table A21 in appendix. 
20 
 
choose inflation as 1st priority only and to the inclusion of income and/or a measure of left-right self-
placement. The variables elderly and retired are statistically significant at the 10% level when the 
Eurobarometer data is restricted to the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s, respectively. See section 3.1 in appendix 
for more details on variables and robustness checks. 
 
3.2. Ageing and the economic orthodoxy of political parties 
Earlier I posited that the share of elderly could influence inflation by shaping the degree of 
inflation aversion among political parties competing in elections. There is to my knowledge no 
direct measure of anti-inflation preferences of all political parties in OECD countries. But the 
party manifesto dataset project (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel & Werner, 2014), which codes 
all party manifestos along several dimensions since the 1950s, has a variable that comes close 
called ‘Economic Orthodoxy’ (per414). This variable captures whether the party manifesto refers 
to “support for a strong currency”. It also captures factors that likely have an effect on inflation 
such as “reduction of budget deficits”, and “thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship”. 
Higher values mean that there are more references to economic orthodoxy in a given manifesto 
in a country’s election. 
Table 2 presents my results estimating the impact of the share of elderly on economic 
orthodoxy when controlling for inflation, trade openness, unemployment, deficits, and left 
cabinet seats17. In column 1, my dependent variable captures the average across all political 
parties’ manifestos in 10 years period average since the 1960s. This allows me to explore how a 
large group of voters that are opposed to inflation forces political parties to shift their policy 
preferences towards inflation. The results controlling for country fixed effects and time effects 
suggest that countries with more elderly as a percentage of the population exhibit more 
                                                             
17 See Table A24 in appendix for results with stepwise insertion of independent variables. 
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economically orthodox political parties18. 
Table 2: The share of elderly and economic orthodoxy in party manifesto 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable – 
economic orthodoxy 
All parties Social democratic 
parties 
Gap between 
conservative and social 
democratic parties 
Period 10 years Yearly Yearly 
Share of elderly 0.186t 0.187* -1.024** 
 (0.096) (0.093) (0.337) 
Inflation rate -0.005 0.023 0.055 
Trade openness 0.012 -0.006 -0.021 
Unemployment rate 0.054 0.044 0.104** 
Deficit  0.035 -0.108* 0.020 
Union density 0.007 0.054* 0.029 
Left cabinet seats 0.009 -0.002 0.014 
Constant -0.750 -2.910t 8.713t 
Observations 94 259 174 
Number of countries 21 21 15 
R-squared overall  0.07 0.14 0.11 
R-squared within  0.26 0.18 0.02 
R-squared between 0.00 0.23 0.00 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1. Results 
from column 1 are similar if Tobit is used instead of OLS. Note that using 5 years period average instead 
of 10 years period average and lagging the share of elderly does not change results from column 1. 
Results from column 2 hold if we include orthodoxy of conservative parties as an independent variable. 
See section 3.2 in appendix for more details on variables and robustness checks. 
 
When using yearly data instead of 10 years period averages, the results are no longer 
significant for party average but differ for distinct parties. If conservative parties already 
represent the views of elderly voters regardless of the size of the group, there should be no 
association between the share of elderly and the economic orthodoxy of conservative party 
manifestos. This is precisely what I find19. By contrast, the share of elderly has a positive 
significant effect on the economic orthodoxy of social democratic party manifestos as shown in 
                                                             
18 The results hold when using Tobit instead of OLS regression, when using 5 years period average and lagging the 
share of elderly – see appendix Table A25. 
19 See Table A25 in appendix. 
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column 220. Using the same model, I now interact the share of elderly with the economic 
orthodoxy of conservative parties as an independent variable21 and plot the interacted effect in 
figure 1: this shows that social democratic parties only respond to an increase in the economic 
orthodoxy of conservative parties in countries with a large elderly population. Column 3 
confirms that the gap in economic orthodoxy between conservative and social democratic parties 
is negatively associated with the share of the elderly. Overall, these findings are consistent with 
the claim that social democratic parties have become more economically orthodox to compete 
for elderly votes. 
Figure 1: Effect of conservative party economic orthodoxy on social democratic party economic 
orthodoxy at different levels of share of elderly 
 
Note: calculated using results from column 2 in table 2 when including in addition an interaction term 
between the orthodoxy of conservative parties and the share of elderly (country and time effects 
included). 
                                                             
20 The results for conservative and social democratic parties are the same when using 5 years period average. 
21 See Table A35 in appendix. 
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3.3. Ageing, economic voting and inflation 
While the previous section shows that parties compete in terms of programs to attract elderly 
votes by becoming more economically orthodox, it says nothing about the incentives of political 
parties to contain inflation once in power and why having a large share of elderly might have an 
effect on these incentives. To test whether the elderly punish the incumbent more than non-
elderly/non-retired individuals I use individual level voting data from the second, third and 
fourth waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems22. This covers elections in a range 
of parliamentary democracies between 2001 and 2016. For each election of the lower house in all 
elections taking place in these countries during this time period, my dependent variable is coded 
1 if the respondent voted for an incumbent party at the last election and 0 otherwise. I control for 
gender, income, education, being unemployed and being elderly, as well as national inflation and 
unemployment rates. The latter two variables are a weighted average of the election and pre-
election years in inflation and unemployment rates, respectively.  
Table 3 presents the results. In column 1, the results from a logistic regression analysis 
suggest that being a retired respondent increases the likelihood of voting for the incumbent, 
while gender has no effect and being unemployed has a negative effect. Higher inflation and 
higher unemployment both reduce the likelihood of an individual voting for the incumbent, in 
line with previous economic voting literature. Having voted for the current incumbent in a 
previous election increases the chances of voting for that incumbent in the current election. In 
column 2, I interact inflation with the dummy variable ‘retired’ and plot the interaction in figure 
2: consistent with my expectation, this reveals that an increase in inflation reduces the 
                                                             
22 This dataset comes from a much wider and ongoing research project on economic voting and social groups with 
Dr Abel Bojar. 
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probability of voting for the incumbent party much more for retired than for non-retired 
respondents. Note that replacing the retired dummy with an elderly dummy does not change the 
results23. 
Table 3: The impact of being elderly and inflation on support for the incumbent 
Column (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Vote for incumbent Vote for incumbent 
Regression method Logit Logit 
Retired respondent 0.169*** 0.289*** 
 (0.022) (0.031) 
Inflation rate -0.038*** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Retired*Inflation  -0.046*** 
  (0.009) 
Male respondent 0.010 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Unemployed respondent -0.185*** -0.187*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
Unemployment rate -0.084*** -0.084*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Past vote for incumbent 2.553*** 2.552*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant -1.673*** -1.694*** 
 (0.131) (0.131) 
Observations 88,077 88,077 
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.25 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1. Education and income 
controls included but not shown. The results are the same if being an elderly respondent (i.e. aged 65 
years old and older) is used instead of being retired. 
                                                             
23 See appendix Table A42. 
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Figure 2: Effect of inflation on support for the incumbent conditional on whether respondent is 
retired 
 
Note: Calculated using results from column 2 in table 3. 
 
3.4. Ageing and central bank independence 
To test the impact of the share of elderly on the choice of institutions that affect inflation, I 
collect data for 21 OECD countries in the period 1960 to 2000 on the share of elderly and central 
bank independence (CBI), as well as a battery of controls. CBI has been shown to be introduced 
to lower inflation and indeed is associated with lower inflation. Many CBI indices exist (Alesina, 
Mirrlees, & Neumann 1989; Cukierman, Webb, & Neyapti 1992; Eijffinger & de Haan, 1996; 
Grilli, Masciandaro, & Tabellini 1991), but I choose to use the Cuckierman index (Cuckierman, 
Webb & Neyapti, 1992) partly because it is widely used and partly because the update by Polillo 
and Guillén (2005) has the best coverage for my time period. Note however that this index does 
not capture the ECB’s monetary stance and therefore limits my sample to pre-EMU times24. I 
                                                             
24 This is perhaps for the better since the ECB’s policy may have different effects in distinct countries and some 
authors have argued that unlike national central banks the ECB no longer represents a credible threat to excessive 
wage agreements. See Hancké (2013) and Johnston (2012). See footnote 24. 
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control for real GDP growth, unemployment, deficit, trade openness, industrial employment, left 
cabinet share, union density, wage coordination and social transfers. I also include country and 
time effects but note that dropping these or running more parsimonious models do not change the 
results. 
Table 4: Determinants of central bank independence 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable CBI CBI CBI 
Period Yearly 5 years average 10 years average 
Regression method OLS OLS OLS 
Share of elderly 0.045** 0.048** 0.042* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Real GDP growth -0.003 -0.007 -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.014) 
Unemployment rate 0.013* 0.012* 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Deficit 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) 
Trade openness 0.002t 0.004* 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industrial employment -0.199 -0.637 -0.621 
 (0.444) (0.483) (0.713) 
Left cabinet share -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Union density 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Wage coordination 0.012 0.021 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.037) 
Social transfers -0.011t -0.015* -0.015 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Constant -0.096 -0.058 -0.070 
 (0.233) (0.214) (0.266) 
Observations 699 162 94 
Number of countries 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall model 0.11 0.11 0.14 
R-squared within model 0.58 0.70 0.73 
R-squared between model 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
See section 3.4 in appendix for more details on variables and robustness checks. 
 
27 
 
Table 4 shows the results and report robust standard errors clustered by country. In 
column 1, I run the regression on yearly data: the share of elderly and unemployment both have 
positive and significant coefficients at the 5% level, while trade openness has a positive 
association and social transfers a negative association at the 10% level. In column 2, I run the 
regression on 5 years period average: the coefficients for the share of elderly and unemployment 
are still positive and significant, while trade openness and social transfers become significant at 
the 5% level. In column 3, I run the regression on 10 years period average: the result for the 
share of elderly is unchanged. Overall, the results concerning the preferences of the elderly and 
the empirical mechanisms linking the share of the elderly to inflation are consistent with my 
expectations. 
 
4. Empirical Tests of the Determinants of Inflation 
To test the impact of the share of elderly on inflation rates, I collect annual data for 21 OECD 
countries in the period between 1960 and 200025. This time period allows me to test the 
determinants of cross-national variation in inflation both in the relatively low inflation period of 
post-war Europe, the high inflation episodes of the 1970s and the –very - low inflation thereafter. 
I initially focus on developed economies because they have more established democracies, more 
comparable economic structures and development levels, and then extend my analysis to a 
                                                             
25 See section 4 in the appendix for countries included and more information on all variables. Most of my data is 
available until 2012, but my index of central bank independence is available only until 2000. Thereafter Eurozone 
countries share the same currency and monetary policy is carried out by the European Central Bank (ECB). The 
common monetary policy of the ECB may introduce polarising inflation dynamics. By removing the sanction that 
national central banks could impose on the sheltered sector, the European monetary union leads to polarisation 
between sheltered and non-sheltered sectors. Cross-national variation in inflation rates may also be affected by these 
polarising dynamics since countries without coordinated wage bargaining will experience greater inflationary 
pressures in the absence of a national central banks that can punish deviations - see Hancké (2013) and Johnston 
(2012) for more on this. 
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sample of 175 countries.  
My main dependent variable is the change in the overall consumer price inflation from 
one year to the next, expressed as a percentage, which is most directly relevant for people’s 
purchasing power. My main independent variable is the share of the population that is 65 years 
old and over. My baseline model controls for various economic, institutional and political factors 
that are likely to affect inflation and are discussed with the results. 
There are two types of problems with Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) data. The first is 
that the error structure may suffer from heteroscedasticity and/or auto-correlation which would 
lead to unreliable test statistics when using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I report robust 
standard errors clustered by country throughout to address the panel structure of my data and 
neutralize the biases that auto-correlation26 and heteroskedasticity27 would have on standard 
errors. The second issue concerns the temporal structure of the data. If both my dependent and 
my key independent variables are heavily trended upwards or downwards – or more formally 
have non-constant means – then they may be non-stationary and any statistically significant 
association between them may be spurious. The Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test for the inflation 
variable rejects the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root and the Fisher panel unit 
root test similarly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level. However, both tests 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity the share of elderly28. 
In principle spurious correlations occur when both variables are non-stationary, which is 
                                                             
26 The Woolridge test of autocorrelation rejects the null hypothesis that there is no auto-correlation. See Table A63 
in appendix. 
27 I reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity using the modified wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity. See 
Table A64 in appendix. 
28 See Tables A52 and A53 in appendix. 
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not the case here. Nevertheless I run a wide range of tests to ensure that my results are not 
spurious. First, I start by running a purely cross-sectional model, which removes any bias arising 
from the temporal dimension (4.1). Second, when running a TSCS on levels of inflation and the 
share of elderly, I include both time dummies and a trend (4.2). Third, I run a model with both 
my dependent variable and key independent variable in first difference and they become 
stationary thereby removing all risks that this association is spurious (4.3). Fourth, I run an error 
correction model which models the temporal dynamics (4.4). Fifth, I rerun all these models on a 
world sample and check whether removing the high income countries changes the association 
(4.5). The association holds throughout and this is not driven by economic development since I 
include GDP per capita in all my regressions and removing countries with high GDP per capita 
in the world sample does not change my results. 
4.1. Cross-sectional analysis of inflation 
The bivariate correlation coefficient between inflation and the share of elderly in my sample of 
21 OECD countries since 1960 is -0.2797 (significant p-value of 0.000). I compute the average 
for the whole time period for all variables and run a cross-sectional OLS analysis on 21 OECD 
countries.  
Given limited degrees of freedom, I include only essential independent variables. I start 
by including the share of elderly, GDP growth, the unemployment rate which may put downward 
pressure on inflation through its effect on wages, and the degree of capital openness since capital 
may exit countries where inflation is deemed too high29. I then add the degree of trade openness 
which makes inflation more costly, and CBI which can be expected to lead to lower inflation. As 
                                                             
29 See Table A66 in appendix. 
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shown in table 5, the model performs well: 82% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the variation in the independent variables. The coefficients for capital and trade 
openness are negative and significant while unemployment is positive and significant, and CBI is 
not significant. The share of elderly is negative and statistically significant and the results are 
robust to the inclusion of additional controls such as left control of cabinet, union density, or 
deficits, and to the exclusion of outliers (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Sweden). 
Equally, stepwise deletion of insignificant variables does not change the results30. 
Table 5: Cross-sectional determinants of inflation 
Dependent variable Inflation 
Share of elderly -0.23265* 
 (0.130) 
Capital openness -2.31281*** 
 (0.389) 
Unemployment rate 0.13585* 
 (0.064) 
Real GDP -0.46660* 
 (0.257) 
CBI 1.73463 
 (1.414) 
Trade openness -0.00821* 
 (0.005) 
Constant 12.01223*** 
 (2.462) 
Observations 21 
R-squared 0.82 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See sections 4.1 and 4.2 in 
appendix for more details on variables and robustness checks, respectively. 
 
4.2. Time-series cross-section analysis 
As I have more degrees of freedom when keeping both the time and cross-sectional dimensions, I 
can include more controls in the TSCS analysis. In addition to the variables discussed in the 
                                                             
30 See Tables A66 to A70 and Figure A67 in appendix. 
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previous section, I also include the following variables: union density can be expected to lead to 
higher inflation by increasing the bargaining power of workers or to lower inflation if the 
olsonian effect dominates; left control of the government should be associated with higher 
inflation; and wage coordination allows unions to internalize the effects of their wage claims – 
which could otherwise lead to inflation. I choose a wage coordination index which takes values 
between 1 (low coordination) and 5 (high coordination) (Visser 2013). Inspections for 
collinearity did not reveal any problems with this wider set of independent variables. 
I start with an empty model with just the share of elderly and then stepwise introduce 
country fixed effects, time effects, and then a trend31. The full results are presented in table 6. 
The share of elderly is negative and statistically significant: an additional 1 percentage point 
increase in the share of elderly is associated with 0.648 percentage point fall in inflation rates. 
The unemployment rate and capital openness are both negative and significant, while left control 
of the cabinet, wage coordination, and central bank independence are not statistically significant. 
Union density has a positive and significant association. Crucially I control for GDP per capita 
which captures the changing level of economic development of countries over time. This is 
important because it may be that economic modernization results in both higher life expectancy 
and falling inflation. However, the variable is not statistically significant. Since country and time 
effects are included, my results are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity. The trend is negative 
but not statistically significant.  
I carry out a battery of robustness checks. Including a lagged dependent variable or 
lagging all independent variables does not change the results. Using Generalized Least Squares 
                                                             
31 Table A71 in appendix. 
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(GLS) or reporting Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) with an AR(1) process instead of 
robust clustered standard errors does not change my result concerning the share of elderly. 
Dichotomizing the dependent variable to take value 1 if inflation is above 10 (very high 
inflation) and 0 otherwise, and running a logistic model does not change the results: the share of 
elderly continues to be significant at the 10% level32. 
Table 6: TSCS determinants of inflation 
Dependent variable Inflation 
Share of elderly -0.648* 
 (0.269) 
Unemployment rate -0.313** 
 (0.109) 
GDP per capita, 1000s 0.228 
 (0.176) 
Capital Openness -0.885* 
 (0.339) 
Trade openness -0.032 
 (0.023) 
Union Density 0.099*** 
 (0.023) 
Left parties, % cabinet posts 0.001 
 (0.003) 
Wage coordination 0.078 
 (0.167) 
Central Bank Independence 1.486 
 (1.122) 
Constant 10.946** 
 (2.893) 
Fixed effects  Yes 
Time effects Yes 
Trend -0.080 
Observations 597 
Number of countries 21 
R-squared within model 0.77 
R-squared overall model 0.44 
R-squared between model 0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t 
p<0.1. The dependent variable is inflation rate as captured by Consumer Price Index. See sections 4.1 
and 4.3 in appendix for more details on variables and robustness checks, respectively. 
                                                             
32 See Tables A71 and A72. 
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In addition, controlling for a squared term of union density33, debt, deficit, terms of trade, 
educational attainment, industrial employment, social transfers, union authority, union 
concentration, home ownership, structural unemployment, employment protection legislation, 
whether the country is in Europe, or whether the country is a Liberal Market Economy does not 
change the results34. I have also rerun my analysis when replacing the share of elderly by the 
dependency rate35 and the results are unchanged. Finally, I carried out a stepwise jackknife 
country exclusion and the result are robust to the exclusion of any one country36. 
4.3. TSCS analysis on first difference in dependent and independent variables 
As noted previously, inflation is stationary but the share of elderly is non-stationary. While my 
cross-sectional analysis cannot by design be biased by non-stationarity and my earlier TSCS 
analysis included both time effects and a trend, I now rerun my analysis on the first difference of 
both inflation and the share of elderly, where both variables are non-stationary37 and hence 
cannot be spuriously related. As before I first run an empty model while controlling for country 
and time effects as well as including a trend, the coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant. This association is robust to a jackknife stepwise country exclusion38.  
Next, I add my independent variables and present the results in table 7. The coefficient 
for the share of elderly remains negative and statistically significant. The first difference in 
unemployment is negatively associated whereas the first difference in GDP per capita and wage 
coordination are not significantly associated. Union density, left wing control of cabinet and 
                                                             
33 To capture the Calmfors Driffil (1988) hypothesis. 
34 See Tables A73 and A74 in appendix. 
35 The dependency rate is the number of elderly divided by working age population – see Table A75 in appendix. 
36 See Table A76 in appendix. 
37 See Tables A55 and A58 in appendix. 
38 See Tables A78 to A80 in appendix. 
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central bank independence are all included in levels for theoretical reasons39: only union density 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Table 7: First difference analysis 
Dependent variable First difference inflation rate 
Share of elderly -1.209t 
(first difference) (0.634) 
Unemployment rate -0.418* 
(first difference) (0.170) 
GDP per capita, 1000s -0.100 
(first difference) (0.209) 
Wage coordination 0.112 
(first difference) (0.125) 
Union Density -0.023t 
 (0.012) 
Left-wing parties in % cabinet posts 0.000 
 (0.003) 
Central Bank Independence 0.581 
 (0.450) 
Constant 0.619 
Observations 644 
Number of countries 21 
Fixed Effects  Yes 
Time Effects Yes 
Trend 0.024 
R-squared within model 0.37 
R-squared overall model 0.34 
R-squared between model 0.00 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t 
p<0.1. See sections 4.1 and 4.4 in appendix for more details on variables and robustness checks. 
 
Removing country fixed effects, replacing the share of elderly by the dependency rate, or 
rerunning the regression with Generalized Least Squares (GLS) or Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) with an AR(1) process does not change my results40. I check the robustness of my 
results for the same additional controls as in the previous analysis on levels and the effect of the 
                                                             
39 The argument about the inclusiveness and strength of union movements is an argument about the level of union 
density. Similarly what matters for the left is the level of control rather than increase in percentage of cabinet seats 
and central bank independence only changes rarely so running it as a first difference would artificially limit its 
potential effect. 
40 See Table A78 in appendix. 
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share of elderly on inflation remains negative and significant41. Rerunning a more parsimonious 
model with just the first differences in the share of elderly, unemployment, GDP per capita and 
the level of CBI does not change my results. As before, jackknife stepwise country exclusion 
does not change my results. Careful examination of inflation rate over the whole sample reveals 
that there are outliers in the 1970s and in the 1990s. I therefore rerun my analysis while 
excluding the 1970s and then while excluding the 1990s, respectively, from my sample. The 
coefficient for the share of elderly remains statistically significant42. Overall, I conclude that the 
association between inflation and the share of elderly is not spuriously driven by non-
stationarity, omitted variable bias, unobserved country or time heterogeneity nor by problems 
with the structure of my errors. 
 
4.4. Dynamics of adjustments: Error Correction Model 
A more formal way of investigating time dynamics is to use an Error Correction Model (ECM). 
So far my results show that there is a robust association between the share of elderly and 
inflation, but say little about the dynamics of adjustment. I therefore use a single equation ECM 
of the standard form43. In the first column of table 8, I report a parsimonious model with the 
share of elderly as my only independent variable. The results suggest that the short run effect of 
an increase in elderly on inflation is 0.042 but not statistically significant. This makes sense 
conceptually since once one clearly distinguishes between long and short run effects, one cannot 
expect inflation rates to directly and instantaneously respond to a change in the share of the 
elderly. 
                                                             
41 See Tables A81 to A83 in appendix. 
42 See Table A83 in appendix. 
43 See section 4.5 in appendix for details on the ECM. 
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The long run effect is calculated by taking the ratio of the coefficient of the lagged share 
of elderly to the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and is equal to -0.79, with an 
adjustment process (error correction) of 0.14 per period44. In other words, the total long run 
effect of 1 percentage point increase in the share of elderly is 0.79 percentage point lower 
inflation, but in t+1 this initially results in 0.14*0.79 reduction in inflation, in t+2 and so on. 
Because the estimate of the long run coefficient -0.79 is a recalculation from two estimated 
coefficients, we need to also recalculate the standard error to assess whether it is statistically 
significant, which we can do using the Stata command nlcom. As can be seen in the last row 
before the constant, the long run effect is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Note that 
including country fixed effects does not change the results. 
Next, I recalculate the long term effect when including one control at a time by itself: 
controlling for trade openness, capital openness, CBI, GDP per capita, union density, 
unemployment rate, wage coordination, social transfers, left governments, deficit, home 
ownership or employment protection legislation does not change the results45. I then stepwise 
add the following variables in both lagged and first difference (to calculate their short and long 
term effects) and then rerun the regression with each new additional variable: GDP per capita, 
CBI, capital openness, employment protection legislation, union density, unemployment rate, 
wage coordination, social transfers, left share of cabinet, and deficit. For each regression I 
calculate and report the long term effect of the share of elderly which remains negative and 
significant46. Note that as more independent variables are included the size of the sample is 
                                                             
44 See section 4.5 in appendix for the proof of how the long run effect and error correction can be derived from this 
empirical model. 
45 See Table A90 in appendix. 
46 See Tables A91 and A92 in appendix. 
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reduced since data availability is not consistent across variables. In column 2, I report the final 
model which includes country and time effects as well as a trend: the long term effect of the 
share of elderly on inflation remains negative and statistically significant47. 
Table 8: Results from an Error Correction Model 
Column (1) (2) 
Dependent variable First difference in inflation 
Inflation (lagged) -0.140*** -0.459*** 
Share of elderly (first difference) -0.042 -1.095 
Share of elderly (lagged) -0.111*** -0.228t 
GDP per capita  (first difference)  -1.048** 
GDP per capita  (lagged)  0.446** 
CBI  (first difference)  2.512 
CBI (lagged)  1.165 
Capital openness  (first difference)  -0.482 
Capital openness (lagged)  -0.444** 
Employment in industry (first difference)  -8.318 
Employment in industry (lagged)  5.856 
Union Density  (first difference)  0.068t 
Union Density (lagged)  0.023 
Unemployment rate  (first difference)  -0.137 
Unemployment rate (lagged)  -0.101 
Coordination  (first difference)  0.089 
Coordination (lagged)  0.057 
Social Transfers (first difference)  -0.382* 
Social Transfers (lagged)  -0.137 
Left share of cabinet seats (first difference)  -0.001 
Left share of cabinet seats (lagged)  -0.001 
Deficit  (first difference)  0.154** 
Deficit (lagged)  -0.065 
Long run effect of elderly on inflation: -0.7949738*** -0.4961375* 
Constant 2.184*** 6.340** 
Observations 1,089 558 
Number of countries 21 21 
R-squared within model 0.10 0.59 
R-squared overall model 0.08 0.31 
R-squared between model 0.01 0.61 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1. The 
coefficient for the short term effect of a change in the share of elderly and of the lagged inflation 
capturing the adjustment process (or error correction) can be interpreted as such, but interpreting the 
long run effect requires recalculating the coefficient (and its associated standard error) directly using the 
Stata nlcom command (this is reported in the row “Long run effect of elderly on inflation”). See section 
4.5 in appendix for more details on ECMs and for a range of robustness checks. 
                                                             
47 The short term and recalculated long term effects of each independent variable are reported in table A92 in the 
appendix. 
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4.5. Ruling out economic modernization and an ‘economic’ channel with a world sample  
It would in principle be possible that OECD countries have developed economically in a way 
that has jointly led to ageing and lower inflation. As economies modernize, the birth rate falls 
and longevity increases at the same time as economic institutions become more effective at 
containing inflation. However, this alternative ‘economic modernization’ narrative of ageing and 
falling inflation is unlikely to bias my results because I control for GDP per capita which 
captures economic modernization throughout my empirical analysis in previous sections. At the 
same time, because OECD countries are broadly at a similar level of economic development as 
well as having aged significantly, it might be difficult to arbitrate between my argument and this 
alternative modernization narrative. Therefore I now extend my analysis to include countries 
with many different levels of economic development, share of elderly and inflation rates by 
collecting data on a much larger sample including 175 countries between 1960 and 201348. This 
also allows me to investigate whether my argument ‘travels’ to developing and emerging 
economies.  
I first start by calculating period average for all variables that are available for a large 
number of countries. I run a series of cross-sectional regressions with just the share of elderly on 
the right hand side and then add stepwise GDP growth, unemployment, a democratic index, 
stock market capitalization, and left control of the executive49. The coefficient for the share of 
elderly is negative and significant, while the size of stock market is negatively associated with 
inflation50. Controlling for national income per capita does not change the results. Including an 
                                                             
48 Depending on model specification, the number of countries and years that are covered by my analysis varies as a 
result of differences in the data availability of each independent variable. 
49 See section 4.6 in appendix for variable source and description, and all results discussed in this section. 
50 Consistent with Posen’s argument. 
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index of central bank independence that is available for 93 countries in 2003 and running a cross-
sectional analysis does not change my results concerning the impact of the elderly51. 
Next, I run a TSCS regression analysis on the yearly data while including both time and 
country effects. Some countries have very high inflation which might be driving results so I 
impose several restrictions on the dependent variable (<100, <50 and logarithmic transformation) 
which does not change the results. Rerunning the analysis in first differences while controlling 
for GDP growth or national income per capita does not change the results. I then rerun this 
analysis on GDP growth and the share of elderly in both lags and first differences, while 
including time and country effects, to be able to calculate long run effects. As was the case in the 
sample of OECD countries, the long run effect of the share of elderly is negative and 
significant52. I then return to my analysis in levels and add stepwise unemployment, stock market 
size, a democracy index, and Left executive. Replacing GDP growth by national income per 
capita does not change the results53.  
I noted earlier that the relationship between inflation and the share of the elderly could 
occur through an economic rather than political mechanisms. Given my earlier evidence on the 
political mechanisms, it is clear that there is at least part of the effect which occurs through the 
political arena, but this does not rule out an additional non-electoral economic mechanism. One 
way to explore this issue further is to compare the effect of the elderly on inflation rates in 
countries with different degrees of democracy, using an additive index of the degree of 
democracy that takes values 0 to 10 (higher values suggest more democratic institutions).  
                                                             
51 See appendix Table A96. 
52 See Table A98 in appendix. 
53 See Table A99 in appendix. 
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Figure 3: Effect of share of elderly on inflation depending on degree of democracy 
 
Note: this graph plots the interaction effect between the share of elderly and the index of democracy in a 
regression that controls for GDP growth and time dummies and where all observations with a dependent 
variable with values higher than 100 are excluded from analysis. The confidence interval use robust 
standard errors clustered by country. Note that including country effects, replacing GDP growth by 
national income per capita, or excluding all countries with national income per capita above $20,000 
does not change the results (see section 4.6 in appendix). 
 
I rerun a simple model of inflation as a function of GDP growth, time dummies and an 
interaction between the share of elderly and the democratic index, and present the interaction in 
Figure 3: the share of elderly is only negatively and significantly associated with inflation when 
countries have a democratic score of 8, 9 or 10 (i.e. when they have ‘high’ democracy scores). If 
the causal mechanism operated mainly through a non-electoral channel, the effect would be 
statistically significant regardless of the degree of democracy. This interaction is unchanged if 
we include country fixed effects, or we control for unemployment or stock market size54. If we 
include national income per capita, which neutralizes the effect of economic modernization, we 
                                                             
54 See Figures A101 to A103 in appendix. 
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observe that the negative effect of the share of elderly on inflation only holds in countries with a 
democratic score of 9 or 1055. Finally, we can exclude all countries that are economically 
modernized by restricting the sample to countries with national income per capita under 
$20,00056. The results are unchanged so the association between inflation and ageing does not 
occur through an economic mechanism nor is it biased by broader economic modernization 
dynamics. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Previous literature on the determinants of inflation emphasizes the role of ideas and institutions, 
and to a lesser extent interest group. While these approaches are valuable, this article has argued 
that by neglecting the role of electoral politics, these explanations miss out an important 
determinant of the cross-national variation in inflation rates. For both methodological and 
theoretical reasons, this article has focused on the share of elderly to show how aging affects 
inflation rates through electoral politics. 
I have argued that countries with a larger share of elderly exhibit lower inflation because 
elderly voters are inflation averse, numerous, and politically powerful. Political parties therefore 
compete for their votes before elections and are influenced by their preferences while in 
government because they fear electoral penalties at the next section. As a result, in countries with 
a larger share of elderly, governments pursue lower inflation. 
A wide range of findings support this argument: Older voters are more inflation averse, 
                                                             
55 See Figure A102 in appendix. 
56 See Figure A104 in appendix. 
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countries with more elderly have more economically orthodox political parties, the electoral 
punishment for inflation is higher among elderly voters, and countries with more elderly exhibit 
higher CBI and lower inflation. I have tested the latter association between the share of elderly 
and inflation rates using a wide variety of specifications, methods, and samples. My results show 
that the magnitude of this effect is sufficiently strong to suggest we were missing an important 
determinant of inflation rates, and the evidence does not suggest that non-stationarity, omitted 
variable bias, unobserved heterogeneity, or economic modernization are biasing this association. 
Although this article has focused on the effect of only one social group—the elderly—on 
one main economic outcome—inflation—this represents an important contribution to the 
comparative political economy literature in several ways. First, my findings show convincingly 
that electoral politics, not just institutions or ideas, also matter for explaining variation in 
inflation rates. Further research should analyse the impact of other electoral groups on inflation. 
Second, extending my argument beyond the case of inflation would suggest that aging may have 
important effects on other economic outcomes and policies. This represents a valuable avenue 
for further research. Third, ageing may have represented a powerful driver behind the shift to a 
low inflation regime in the past decades, though it is unlikely to alone explain such a shift. 
Looking to the future, as populations continue to age, the political imperative to keep inflation 
low may force politicians to adopt suboptimal economic policies 
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